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Abstract: 
 
The primary concern of United States national security policy, as detailed 
in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, has shifted from asymmetrical counter-
insurgency operations to countering inter-state strategic competition by rogue 
regimes and revisionist powers. This doctrinal shift has prompted an increased 
emphasis on military lethality, particularly in strategic-level cyberspace 
operations intended to counter open challenges to the global security environment 
and United States preeminence. Drawing from the theory of constraints in 
industrial engineering and Bayesian search theory in operations research, this 
paper identifies the key organizational constraints that hinder the lethality of the 
Department of Defense’s strategic-level cyberspace operations units in light of a 
continued struggle for available cyberspace personnel. Current force structure 
paradigms and command and control policies are identified as the key limiting 
factors of military lethality in cyberspace. This paper argues for ruthlessly 
prioritizing the elimination and improvement of these constraints in order to align 
Department of Defense policies with efforts to project strategic power in and 
through cyberspace. 
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When U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced the nation’s new 
National Defense Strategy, he emphasized that “inter-state strategic competition, 
not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”.1 This change 
in U.S. strategic thinking has marked a dramatic doctrinal shift away from 
asymmetrical counter-insurgency operations to long-term symmetrical warfare 
between nuclear powers. It is a recognition of the increasingly entropic nature of 
the global strategic environment, in which a de facto state of open conflict exists 
between numerous nations across the globe, and an acknowledgement of 
increased military and economic development by rivalling powers. The 
unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy characterizes the greatest 
threat to U.S. prosperity and security to be the “reemergence of long-term 
strategic competition by...revisionist powers and rogue regimes”.2 Predatory 
economic policy and strategic brinkmanship, not jihadist extremism, are now of 
principal strategic interest. The revised strategic posture of the U.S. seeks to 
address the influence operations, information campaigns, and diplomatic 
maneuverings of rival nation states seeking increasingly greater degrees of 
regional hegemony and global influence.  
 
Of particular importance to the U.S.’s efforts to successfully adapt to a 
changing global operating environment is the ability to operate effectively in and 
through the cyberspace domain. Increased military lethality, particularly in the 
realm of cyberspace operations, is highlighted as the first and most important 
strategic priority in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.3 Addressing his vision 
and priorities for the nascent U.S. Cyber Command in light of the strategic shift to 
competition between nuclear superpowers, General Paul Nakasone posited that 
“the locus of the struggle for power has shifted to cyberspace”.4 In light of the 
acknowledged strategic need for increased lethality in the cyberspace domain, the 
Department of Defense must address several critical challenges that impede the 
nation’s strategic-level cyberspace efforts.  A lack of unity of command amongst 
Cyber Command’s mission teams is a key issue affecting strategic cyberspace 
lethality, and is exacerbated by systemic recruiting and retention challenges 
across the military cyber workforce. In order to meet the challenges of a changing 
global strategic environment, the Department of Defense should ruthlessly 
prioritize strategic cyberspace lethality by modernizing Cyber Command’s force 
structure, unifying the multiple chains of command that presently exist across its 
formations.  
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 The concept of ruthless prioritization is an idea borrowed from the theory 
of constraints, a management and process improvement methodology developed 
in the field of industrial engineering.5 The management philosophy behind the 
theory of constraints suggests that manageable processes are limited from 
achieving significantly greater efficiency by a disproportionately small number of 
constraints, or bottlenecks.6 After identifying a system’s bottlenecks, the theory of 
constraints dictates that an organization ruthlessly subjugate all decisions to the 
systematic improvement of that constraint until it is no longer the limiting factor 
of the system.7 From a standpoint of accomplishing an organization’s objectives, 
the greatest level of overall organizational progress is achieved through the 
elimination of these critical constraints first, prior to addressing other 
impediments. Considering inter-state strategic competition in cyberspace within 
the context of the theory of constraints, it is important to characterize issues 
facing the cyberspace operations workforce as constraints to achieving strategic-
level success in cyberspace.  
 
Another important factor to consider in the process of systematically 
identifying and improving a system’s bottlenecks is the feasibility of 
accomplishing the improvement of individual constraints. This concept is based in 
Bayesian search theory, a form of statistics applied in operations research to 
identify a mathematically optimized search order based on probabilistic modeling. 
In Bayesian search theory, the locations that should be searched first are not 
necessarily the locations where an object is most likely to be, but also where it is 
most likely that an object could be found if it is actually located there.8 Applied in 
an organizational context, it is not only the criticality of a constraint that should 
be considered, but also the feasibility of addressing and improving that constraint.  
 
Considering bureaucracy at the scale of the U.S. Department of Defense, 
there are a large number of organizational constraints that potentially have a 
detrimental effect on achieving strategic success in cyberspace. However, the 
focus should be narrowed to those policies, authorities, and decisions that can be 
feasibly addressed within a reasonable time frame and without considerable 
expense or disruption. For instance, consolidating all military cyberspace 
personnel to a new and separate branch of military service would likely eliminate 
a great deal of organizational constraints associated with a joint force the size of 
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U.S. Cyber Command.9 However, the amount of time, resources, and legislation 
required for such a change make it infeasible to achieve from a practical, present-
oriented standpoint. In order to bring about impactful change in the nation’s 
strategic cyberspace forces, it is critical that the solutions proposed are not only 
related to the system’s most critical constraints, but also feasible in terms of time, 
resources, and authorities.  
 
Military and political leaders have recognized, rightfully, that the U.S. 
military no longer holds the advantage of uncontested superiority across all 
warfighting domains.10 As acknowledged in the National Defense Strategy, the 
U.S. has “no preordained right to victory.”.11 Instead, military forces operating in 
all domains must adapt to fighting in a highly contested environment, in which 
unilateral superiority across all warfighting domains is not always guaranteed. 
Looking ahead to potential future conflicts between nation-states, the inherently 
accessible and asymmetric nature of the global information environment may 
form an operating environment in which it is impossible to ever operate 
uncontested in the cyberspace domain.12 The realities presented by a rapidly-
changing and technologically interconnected global operating environment are in 
sharp contrast to the military’s doctrinal assumptions for the better part of the last 
half-century. In response to this, the Department of Defense has rapidly stood up 
U.S. Cyber Command, now a full unified combatant command, and charged it 
with the responsibility for unifying, coordinating, and executing the nation’s 
cyberspace operations. 
 
 Cyber Command’s force structure is based on the Cyber Mission Force 
(CMF), a team-based construct consisting of 133 cyber teams, each specializing 
in offense, defense, or operational support. The majority of CMF teams are 
aligned to support the various Combatant Commands, or retained directly by each 
separate service branch.13 Additionally, a small number of these teams are 
organized under the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) as a direct 
subordinate unit of U.S. Cyber Command.14 Each branch of the military is 
responsible for providing a set number of these teams to Cyber Command through 
their respective cyber component command (ARCYBER, AFCYBER, 
MARFORCYBER, and FLTCYBER), and is responsible for training, manning, 
and equipping the CMF teams in order to conduct their respective missions.15  
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The CMF is the primary force responsible for the conduct of cyberspace 
operations at the strategic level. When nation-states present a significant threat to 
U.S. infrastructure, systems, or interests, it is Cyber Command’s teams that are 
charged with the responsibility of conducting full-spectrum cyberspace operations 
to defeat and deter that threat. This responsibility includes combating large-scale 
influence operations and dis-information campaigns targeting democratic 
processes, problem sets that are of tremendous national importance and 
visibility.16 Cyber Command’s offensive mission teams are the U.S.’s main 
instrument of projecting strategic power in cyberspace, and are the on-call force 
responsible for national-level priorities and objectives in cyberspace.  
 
In the coming years, the daunting challenges faced by Cyber Command in 
recruiting and retaining the cyber personnel assigned to the CMF are projected to 
continue to increase in scale and severity.17 Manpower studies and projections of 
future job demand in cyber-related work roles suggest there simply aren’t enough 
qualified cyberspace operations personnel to fully meet the anticipated cyber 
personnel needs of all the services.18 Coupled with the significant time and 
expense required to train, clear, and certify new cyberspace operations personnel, 
there will continue to be an unavoidable shortage of available personnel in the 
CMF.19 Without novel, and potentially controversial, changes to recruiting criteria 
and enlistment methods, this constraint is unlikely to change in the foreseeable 
future. This problem is further perpetuated by an injurious manning cycle that 
leaves offensive CMF teams struggling to maintain operationally effective levels 
of trained and experienced personnel.  
 
In light of an acknowledged lack of cyber personnel, Cyber Command’s 
effective employment of available resources is of critical importance to the U.S’s 
strategic success in cyberspace. However, despite the advantage gained through 
fostering a highly collaborative joint command environment, Cyber Command’s 
current force structure fosters a lack of command unity for teams assigned to 
support a command outside of their service. This introduces a critical constraint 
that hinders strategic cyberspace lethality, bottlenecking Cyber Command’s 
operational efforts.  
 
Unity of command is a critical axiom inherent to joint-level military 
operations, and is meant to ensure that a subordinate has a clear chain of 
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command above them from which to receive orders and direction.20 Unity of 
command is utilized in virtually every military organization across the services; a 
Navy submarine, an Air Force fighter squadron, a Marine infantry platoon, and an 
Army tank company all share one characteristic in common: a single commander 
responsible for both the administrative and operational functions of that unit 
during execution of its mission. While it is common for units to often be tasked to 
support other commands, and may even be detached from their “owning” 
command to do so, they will always maintain a command element that is 
responsible for the overall administrative and operational aspects of that unit.  
 
Because of the manner in which legislation has dictated the Department of 
Defense to construct Cyber Command, the various teams from each service 
remain under administrative control (ADCON) of their providing service, while 
being assigned under operational control (OPCON) of Cyber Command.21 
ADCON responsibilities primarily revolve around providing a trained and ready 
force, and encompass anything pertaining to the unit’s administrative functions, 
including personnel management, training, and readiness. OPCON responsibilities 
center around the execution of the unit’s mission, and consists of the direction and 
employment of the team’s members during the conduct of operations. Neither 
OPCON nor ADCON can operate fully without the other’s support, and a unit 
fundamentally depends on the effective and timely support of both OPCON and 
ADCON responsibilities in order to function.  
 
The bifurcation of command responsibilities between multiple leaders 
produces competing sets of priorities wherein multiple commanders each 
maintain control over critical functions of a single unit.22,23In Cyber Command’s 
current force structure, a member of an Army National Mission Team reports 
administratively to their service’s ADCON unit commander and operationally to 
their CMF team leader. The result of the services filling a force-supplying 
supporting role to Cyber Command is that service members are subordinate to 
separate administrative and operational chains of command.24 This harmful 
dichotomy manifests regularly when operational and administrative commanders 
find themselves at odds over a unit’s priorities and function.25  
 
In addition to hindering mission accomplishment, having multiple sources 
of command authority also complicates career progression and talent management 
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for cyberspace operations personnel. The responsibilities of an Air Force flight 
commander, for example, are easily understood across the service regardless of 
career field, whereas the responsibilities of a Cyber Support Team Lead are less 
well-known. However, under current implementation of the Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), officer promotions are handled by 
centralized selection boards, and positions like Air Force flight or Army company 
command, typically associated with operational authority, tend to be considered 
more favorable for promotion.26 This creates a difficult choice for officers in 
cyber career fields, who are often forced to decide between career-benefitting 
administrative roles with little operational applicability, or technically demanding 
operational roles at the expense of promotion potential.27 The administrative 
commander who fights to pull personnel away from mission for a unit-mandated 
training event is not acting in the wrong, as their metrics of success and chance of 
promotion rely on the completion of administrative tasks mandated by the next 
step in the administrative chain of command. Likewise, the operational 
commander’s success is determined by the completion of mission-related tasks, 
even at the expense of administrative requirements. This tug-of-war between an 
administrative commander and an operational commander will continue to exist 
for as long as unity of command is not implemented in Cyber Command’s 
command-and-control structure.  
 
The lack of unity of command in the current CMF force structure is a key 
constraint hindering strategic cyberspace lethality, and the Department of Defense 
must ruthlessly prioritize the elimination of this bottleneck. With significant 
attention dedicated in extant research to the retention of experienced cyberspace 
personnel, the vestigial split of administrative and operational control in the CMF 
ought to be considered as not only a critical mission accomplishment factor, but 
also a key issue for retention. If the main recruiting message of the Department of 
Defense is the ability to contribute to a unique cyberspace mission, it should 
expect continued struggles in retention if it fails to employ personnel in a way to 
meaningfully contribute to that mission.28 This requires vesting operational CMF 
commanders with administrative command authority for their units, unifying the 
two chains of command that currently exist across Cyber Command. Ruthless 
prioritization of strategic-level cyberspace operations would dictate that the 
services be required to designate CMF team leaders additionally as the command 
authority for the teams’ corresponding administrative formations. 
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 The strategic global security environment continues to rapidly evolve, and 
open challenges to the established international order and national sovereignty 
will continue. U.S. interests will be increasingly challenged abroad, and the U.S. 
military will continue to operate in heavily contested warfighting domains without 
the decisive overmatch it has grown accustomed to for much of the last half-
century. Russia will continue to engage in deliberate influence operations 
intended to undermine fundamental democratic functions of American society and 
further ideological divisions in the population.29 China will continue its predatory 
economic policies and targeting of U.S. intellectual property and personal 
information through vulnerable networks.30 Iran will continue to pursue 
development of destructive capabilities to increase its regional standing, and 
persist in its sponsorship of terrorist organizations to destabilize neighboring 
regions.31 North Korea will continue to seek coercive influence over the U.S. and 
its allies through pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.32  
 
These threats will continue to develop unchecked so long as there is no 
legitimate deterrence to the actions of revisionist powers and rogue regimes. Put 
more simply by Senate testimony of General Nakasone, because these rivaling 
nation states “do not fear us”.33 It is the stated mission of the Cyber National 
Mission Force to defend the nation against threats of significant consequence in 
cyberspace by imposing cost on adversaries seeking to undermine U.S. influence 
and interests. Inter-state strategic competition will continue to pose an existential 
threat to U.S. safety and security, necessitating deterrence of hostile actors. 
Legitimate deterrence through increased cyberspace lethality demands the ruthless 
prioritization of U.S. strategic efforts in cyberspace, and nothing less.  
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